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Abstract
An efficient market implies that potential gains from trade are fully captured. Achieving this
requires a well-functioning market where prices reflect all available information. In the case of
water rights markets, this implies that the permanent water rights transfer price reflects the sum of
discounted returns to this asset (i.e., the lease price), the market interest rate, and a risk premium
that reflects potential future water scarcity. The purpose of this study is to assess the efficiency of
western U.S. water rights markets by utilizing the asset pricing model to measure how well prices
reflect long-run returns to permanent water rights.
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1. Introduction
The number and scale of environmental markets have increased over time with successes in
programs such as air pollution permit trading (Schmalensee and Stavins 2017) and individual
transferable quota systems for fisheries (Costello, Gaines and Lynham 2008). However, even
well-functioning environmental markets often fail to achieve their maximum theoretical
advantage over other allocation or regulation mechanisms (Teitenberg 1990, Keohane 2007).
The achieved efficiency gains from markets for natural resource assets have also been highly
variable. Markets for fishing quota appear to be quite successful in this regard (Grainger and
Costello 2011); those for wetland and habitat preservation, less so (National Research Council
2001, Parkhurst and Shogren 2003).
This paper examines markets for scarce water, advocated by economists for many
decades (Hartman and Seastone 1970, Vaux and Howitt 1984, Saliba and Bush 1987). While
informal water markets are common in some developing countries (Bjornlund and McKay 2002),
formal inter-sectoral water markets have been slow to develop (Easter et al. 1999) and are
generally immature (Carey, Sunding and Zilberman 2002; Brewer et al. 2008), making empirical
studies of actual water markets uncommon. Nonetheless, studies have demonstrated potential
and realized net benefits from trading in California (Hagerty 2019, Bruno and Jessoe 2019),
south Texas (Chang and Griffin 1992), southern Italy and Spain (Pujol, Raggi, and Viaggi 2006;
Rey, Garrido, and Calatrava 2014), north-central Chile (Hearne and Easter 1997, Hearne and
Donoso 2014), Morocco (Diao and Roe 2003), and Australia (Bjornlund and McKay 2002,
Tisdell 2014, Wheeler, Bjornlund, and Loch 2014, Zuo et al. 2015, Grafton, Horne, and Wheeler
2016, Loch, Wheeler, and Settre 2018). Australia’s water markets may be especially relevant to
western U.S. water markets given that a number of regions in the western U.S. are following the
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Australian case in the design of their water markets (e.g., Nevada’s Diamond Valley and
Humboldt Basin; Young 2015, Zeff et al. 2019, Wheeler et al. 2017).
U.S. water market efficiency (or the lack thereof) has been examined in the prior
literature.1 Brookshire et al. (2004) and Brewer et al. (2008) suggest that U.S. western water
markets are becoming more efficient and that water is moving from lower-valued (agricultural)
to higher-valued (urban and environmental) uses. But some current water rights transfers in the
United States are informal, and even active markets may exhibit high transaction costs (Scott and
Coustalin 1995; Huffaker 2005; Rosegrant, Ringler, and Zhu 2014; Wheeler, Bjornlund, and
Loch 2014; Hagerty 2019).
Market efficiency requires that prices reflect available information about scarcity and
value in use. Therefore, an important area of study—which has been largely missing in the water
market literature—is the role of pricing mechanisms in water rights markets. The purpose of this
study is to assess the efficiency of western U.S. water rights markets by utilizing the asset pricing
model to measure how well prices reflect long-run returns to permanent water rights. We exploit
the variation in prices and quantities for water trades in the western United States between 1990
and 2010 to assess water markets’ capacity to incorporate available information about long-run
returns.
We apply the financial asset pricing model—similar to Newell, Sanchirico, and Kerr
(2005) and Newell, Papps, and Sanchirico (2007) in their applications to New Zealand fishing
quota markets—to U.S. water rights markets, econometrically estimating a water transfer price
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Note that truly efficient markets would also fully address externalities and public goods, important considerations
in the context of water markets (Olmstead 2010). Our analysis does not consider these potential market failures, and
instead focuses on the capacity of water market prices to transmit information about the private benefits and costs of
water use. Finding that water markets do have this capacity would be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to
support their use (through taxation or other means) to address market failures.
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equation for nine western U.S. states for which the requisite data are available. The asset pricing
model specifies the structural relationship between the permanent transfer price (i.e., the asset
price) and the lease price (i.e., returns to the asset), the market interest rate, and a risk premium.
Estimating an empirical specification of the asset pricing model (following Newell et al. 2007)
allows us to assess the extent to which permanent transfer prices are influenced by these three
factors, with a central focus on the lease price—the greater the influence of lease price on
permanent transfer price (controlling for the market interest rate and water scarcity (a measure of
risk)), the more efficient the market is.
To our knowledge, the asset pricing model has not been applied to water markets.2
Despite the small number of observations in our analysis, results suggest that water transfer
prices are positively correlated with lease prices and negatively correlated with interest rates, as
asset pricing theory would predict. These results are somewhat surprising. Though Newell,
Papps, and Sanchirico (2007) find that prices in markets for fishing quota comport with the asset
pricing model, these markets in New Zealand fisheries may be the most well-functioning created
markets for natural assets (Grainger and Costello 2014). In water rights markets where prices are
less stable and more heterogeneous, transaction costs are high, and trading is thin, it would not
be surprising to find that the data were inconsistent with the asset pricing model (Yoskowitz
1999, Edwards and Libecap 2015).
Recognizing that our data include heterogeneous water markets in nine states, we extend
our analysis to examine whether water market prices convey economic information more
efficiently in relatively better-functioning markets. We apply the asset pricing model to a small
regional market (the Mojave Basin area in California), where water transfers and leases represent
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Asset pricing models have also been applied to natural resource markets such as those for agricultural land (Alston
1986) and dairy quota (Wilson and Sumner 2004), in addition to fishing quota markets.
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trades in more homogeneous goods, trading is more active and better-monitored, and transaction
costs are likely much lower than in the general case we assess in our multi-state analysis. The
asset pricing results for the Mojave basin trades are stronger than those in our nine-state model,
and stronger yet when we focus on the most active regions of that market. These results provide
reason for optimism about water markets, should barriers to efficient trading be reduced in the
future.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the asset pricing model in
theoretical and empirical formats. Section 3 discusses the multi-state sample transactions, data
used in the multi-state asset pricing model application, and results. Section 4 presents the asset
pricing model application to the Mojave market, including data and results. Conclusions are
provided in section 5.

2. Asset pricing Theory and Empirical Models
One implication of rational pricing theory for water market transactions is that the present value
of permanent water rights should equal the discounted value of all future expected earnings from
annual water leases. With constant lease prices and a constant growth rate, the price of a
permanent water right would be as in equation (1), where the interest rate (r) is equal to the
expected annual rate of return from holding a water right.
! "#$% =

'$%#"%
(

(1)

Similar to Newell, Papps, and Sanchirico (2007), who apply the present value asset pricing
model to examine the relationship between fishing quota asset and lease prices, we use the
Gordon growth model (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997), as shown in equation (2), and
modify it to conform to the water rights market context.
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In equation (2), !* is the asset price, in our case the permanent water rights transfer price in
period /;

is the future annual return from the asset – i.e., the one-year lease price; 0 is the

interest rate, and 1 is a constant, asset-specific growth rate.
Water rights markets should be affected by future expectations about the value of water,
influenced by expected climate conditions and institutional settings. Therefore, as suggested by
Alston (1986), Cochrane (1992), and Newell, Papps, and Sanchirico (2007), we decompose 0
into a real market interest rate (

and a risk premium ( ), which in our water market case

accounts for future water supply uncertainty.3 The variables used to represent each of these
parameters in the theoretical model are described further in Section 3. Equation (3) provides the
final form of our asset pricing model.
+

!* = (̃ 34, -.
,

,

(3)

We empirically estimate the asset pricing model using data from nine western U.S. states where
permanent transfers and one-year leases are both prevalent. However, even within a state,
regional markets vary; for example, from large federal projects like the Colorado-Big Thompson
(C-BT) project in Colorado or the Central Valley project (CVP) in California, to bilateral
transactions between two neighboring farmers. Thus, as a second test of the asset pricing model,
we also use a unique dataset from a single water market known to be relatively well-developed
and active, located in the Mojave River Basin, in San Bernardino County, California. We repeat
our empirical tests from the nine-state model on the Mojave River Basin market.

3

Ideally, the risk premium would be specific to a particular water right and address both institutional uncertainty
and climate uncertainty. Another approach would be to add a multiplicative function that includes factors related to
uncertainty about the future to the growth model (Newell, Papps, and Sanchirico 2007). However, due to the small
number of observations in our empirical analysis, this approach is not possible.
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As in Newell, Papps, and Sanchirico (2007), in our reduced-form empirical tests of the
asset pricing model in both contexts, we regress water transaction prices on a set of explanatory
variables as in equation (4),

56!789* = :; + := 56>789* + :? 0̃* + :@ A8 + :B 18 + :C µ* + E8 + F789*

(4)

where 56! is the log price of permanent water rights transfer G, in state H, in quarter I, and in year
/; 56> is the log price for a one-year lease;

is the annual real U.S. market interest rate; A is a

risk premium; 1 is the growth rate; µ is linear time trend; E is a state fixed effect or random
effect; and F is the error term. In Section 3, we describe the variables used for 0̃ , A, and 1. In
well-functioning markets, prices of permanent transfers and leases may be determined
simultaneously, so we estimate alternative models in which we instrument for own-state lease
prices using the annual average lease price in all states except the state where a transaction takes
place. From the asset pricing theory discussed above, we expect

, and

. The

expected signs of :@ and :B will depend on the variables used to proxy for A and 1. Generally, a
riskier asset should have a lower price and one with a higher long-term growth rate in expected
profits should have a higher price, all else equal.

3. Multi-state sample data and asset pricing model estimation
3.1 Water transaction data
For the dependent variable in the multi-state asset pricing analysis, we purchased water market
transactions data (permanent water transfers and one-year leases) from Stratecon, Inc. The data
come from monthly issues of an industry publication, Water Strategist (Smith and Vaughan
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1990-94, 1995-2001; Smith 2002-2010), which has been previously described and analyzed in
the literature (Howe and Goemans 2003; Brookshire et al. 2004; Howitt and Hansen 2005;
Brown 2006; Brewer et al. 2008; Basta and Colby (2010), Libecap (2010), Colby et al. (2011),
Grafton et al.(2012), Hansen et al. (2013), Goemans and Pritchet (2014), Hansen et al. (2014),
Olmstead et al. (2016)).4 We omit observations associated with transactions that are outside the
scope of our study; e.g., those involving recycled wastewater effluent, water storage rights, and
multi-year leases as well as those with missing or unreasonable prices (less than $1 per acrefoot), or unidentified buyers. Additionally, while market transactions from 12 states appear in the
Water Strategist data, we include only those nine states with at least some years where both oneyear leases and permanent transfers occurred. A minimum number of years with both types of
transactions occurring in a state is required to estimate equation (4) with state fixed effects.5,6
The final sample comprises 2,158 transactions in nine states, with one water-supplying sector
(agriculture), and two water-buying sectors (agriculture and urban) over the period 1990-2010.
The Water Strategist data product ends in 2010, preventing us from extending the dataset further.
On average, there are thirteen permanent transfers and six one-year leases per year in
each state (Figure 1). The average annual number of transactions increased for both permanent
transfers and leases until the early 2000s, when both dropped significantly, and both have
declined slightly since then. On average, there have been more permanent trades than leases,
except in 2001 and again in 2008, when the numbers were very close. Figure 1 also shows that
the average annual quantity of water permanently transferred by state is much lower and less

4

Until 1995 water transactions were reported in a separate publication associated with the journal Water Intelligence
Monthly. Transactions were reported quarterly from 1995-1998 and monthly from 1999-2010. Though prior
researchers have made these data available publicly, we reconstruct the entire nine-state, 21-year panel to ensure that
the summary data for each transaction (culled from descriptive text in .pdf files) are interpreted consistently.
5
See the Appendix, Section A1 for an additional discussion regarding omitted data.
6
Most states have at least one year where they report zero permanent transfers or zero one-year leases.
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variable than the annual average quantity leased. Average state water lease and transfer prices
have trended upward over time, with significant year-to-year variation (Figure 1).
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1, which reveals significant heterogeneity across
state markets. Over the period 1990-2010, most states averaged fewer than four permanent
transfers and fewer than four leases per year. Colorado, in contrast, averaged more than 60
transfers annually, and California averaged more than 12 one-year leases annually.
Transfer and lease prices are converted to 2009 dollars using the consumer price index
(CPI) and are expressed in dollars per acre-foot ($/AF).7 As one would expect, the average
annual water lease price is much lower than the permanent transfer price for both sectors in all
states (Table 1). Price dispersion across states is large, especially in the case of permanent
transfers. This is not surprising, as water cannot be transferred or leased across states, similar to
prohibitions in fishing quota markets on trades across regions, species, or species-regions. The
highest prices for water leased to the urban sector are paid in Texas, but prices for water leased
to agriculture are highest in California. Permanent water rights transfers in both sectors are most
expensive in Colorado.
To estimate the asset pricing model in equation (4), we aggregate the nine-state water
transaction data by state and quarter, so that the dependent variable, pijqt, is the average statequarter permanent transfer price, and πijqt is the average state-quarter one-year lease price. This
reduces our sample size to 66 observations in the nine states over the period 1992-2009.
Together, six out of nine states account for only 13 observations in the panel, whereas the
remaining three states – California, Colorado, and Texas – contribute 13, 17, and 23
observations, respectively. While this small dataset is far from ideal, the Water Strategist is, to
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An acre-foot, a common unit of volume in U.S. western water trades, is the quantity of water that would flood an
acre of land to one foot in depth, about 326,000 gallons.
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our knowledge, the only available data that summarize such a large and diverse set of U.S.
western water trades that could be used to test the asset pricing model at this scale.
3.2 Other data used in the multi-state asset pricing models
Summary statistics for the remaining variables used in the multi-state asset pricing model
are also reported in Table 2.8 For the real market interest rate (0̃ ), we use the 3-month U.S.
Treasury bill rate from the U.S. Federal Reserve (2015) website. Real interest rates are calculated
by subtracting the inflation rate (measured by the CPI) from these nominal interest rates.
For the risk premium variable, , we use the Irrigation Vulnerability Index (IVI),
constructed using the methodology from Liu et al. (2017). The index provides projections of
future long-term water stress, which we aggregate by state, dividing the difference between
water supply and water use by irrigation water use. In this index, water supply is the sum of
surface water (including reservoir storage) and renewable groundwater sources. Water use is the
sum of irrigation, domestic, industrial and livestock water use.9 Lower values of the IVI indicate
higher levels of water stress (<0.2 is considered stressed). Additional information about the index
is provided in the Appendix, Section A2.
Because the majority of water withdrawals in the region are for irrigation, the growth rate
variable (1) in equations (3) and (4) should capture expectations about the future returns to using
water as an input to agriculture. We use the growth rate of farmland acres irrigated for this
purpose. We know of no projections available for this variable, so we follow Newell, Papps and
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Table 2 also reports summary statistics for the variables used in estimating the asset pricing model for the Mojave
market. These data are discussed further in Section 4.
9
Water supply, water use and irrigation water use are generated by the University of New Hampshire’s Water
Balance Model at the grid cell level and at daily time steps and provided here as state-level (and basin-level for the
Mojave models in Section 4) annual aggregates, which we then average over the period 2013-2099 to obtain a timeinvariant measure. In cases where water supply is less than water use, groundwater mining is used to fulfill the water
use requirement.
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Sanchirico (2007), using historical data on farmland acres irrigated at the state level from the
USDA Irrigation and Water Management Survey (2019) over the period 1988-2018 to estimate
an AR(1) model expressing growth in value as a function of the natural log of acres irrigated, a
time trend, and a constant for each state.10 This approach is based on the assumption that the
drivers of future growth in irrigated land value will be consistent with past drivers. Given our
approach, the estimate of 1 varies by state, but not over time.
3.3 Results from the multi-state asset pricing models
Table 3 reports the results from estimating equation (4) on our multi-state sample. Six
models are reported in Table 3: three using data from all nine states and, as a robustness check,
three using only observations from the three states with the largest number of transactions in the
collapsed panel (California, Colorado and Texas). In these latter models (columns 4-6), the
sample size shrinks from 66 to 53. In columns (1) and (4), we include state fixed effects (FE) to
control flexibly and comprehensively for unobservable, non-time-varying state water market
characteristics. The use of state FEs precludes the identification of coefficients for the risk
premium and growth rate variables, neither of which vary over time. Thus, we also estimate a RE
model, which assumes that the variation across water rights markets (states) is random and
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in the model. Note that a Hausman test supports the
RE estimator, failing to reject that RE is consistent and efficient. Estimates are very similar
across FE and RE models for the coefficients that can be identified in both.
The coefficients on the lease price are positive, and the coefficients on the real interest
rate are negative in all six models in Table 3, consistent with the basic principles of asset pricing
theory. The magnitude of the lease price coefficient is about one-fifth the size of the analogous
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This survey was formerly the Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey. Data are reported every 5 years. The Durbin’s h
test statistic of no autocorrelation in AR(1) models was not rejected in all cases except Colorado.
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coefficient estimate in the New Zealand fishing quota markets study (Newell, Papps, and
Sanchirico 2007). In the New Zealand fishing quota case, the lease price coefficient suggests that
a percent change in the lease price will result in a 76 to 86 percent change in the sale price. In our
U.S. western water markets case, a percent change in the lease price will result in only a 14 to 17
percent change in the permanent transfer price, suggesting that the connection between lease
price and permanent transfer price is weaker in the water markets case. This comparative result is
not surprising, given that fishing quota markets in New Zealand may be among the world’s most
efficient created natural resource asset markets (Grainger and Costello 2011), and may thus
represent a “best case” (thus far) for such markets in practice.11
The coefficients on the real interest rate, while always negative, are only significant in
models without the linear time trend. Not surprisingly, adding the time trend also changes the
magnitude of these coefficient estimates.
Recall that our proxy for the risk premium is the long-run IVI. An increase in the index,
indicating reduced future risk of water stress and shortage, has a positive impact on the water
transfer price in all four models in Table 3 where the coefficient can be identified (the RE
models), consistent with the asset pricing model.
The growth variable coefficient in the multi-state model is positive and statistically
significant, suggesting that, consistent with asset pricing theory, growth in farmland irrigated
acres increases water right transfer prices. Unexpectedly, the three-state sample results show a
statistically significant, but negative coefficient associated with the growth variable. This
counterintuitive result is not consistent with asset pricing theory. However, robustness check
results using a growth variable proxied by crop prices are very similar showing a positive but
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An anonymous referee recommended that we also compare U.S. western water market performance to that of
Australian water markets, using the asset pricing model. We discuss this comparison in the Appendix, section A3.
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statistically insignificant coefficient in the nine-state sample, and a negative, statistically
significant coefficient in the three-state sample (Appendix Table A3).
One potential threat to identification in Table 3 is that lease prices may be endogenous.
That is, while the asset pricing model specifies permanent water transfer prices as a function of
one-year lease prices, lease prices could also be determined in part by transfer prices (or farmers
may consider both options against the benefit of using water for crops). Thus, we also estimated
two-stage least squares (2SLS) models using an instrument for the lease price: the average price
specific to year and state excluding local state observations. In all models, an endogeneity test
fails to reject the hypothesis that the lease price variable is exogenous. Thus, we interpret the
results in Table 3 as the main results and provide 2SLS results in the Appendix, Table A1.12
Taken together, the models estimated using the multi-state data suggest that water market
activity in the western United States is generally consistent with asset pricing theory. Given the
fairly thin markets in this context, as well as the small dataset we are able to construct from the
Water Strategist data, these results are encouraging. However, the difference between the
efficiency with which information about water’s long-run value is transmitted in short-run prices,
and that observed in New Zealand fishing quota markets and other natural resource applications,
also suggests that these markets have significant efficiency improvement potential.
4. Mojave water market
While the Table 3 results are encouraging, the small sample and the heterogeneity of the markets
in our multi-state analysis leave the analysis open to criticism that we cannot fully capture this
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The results of the IV models are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3, with one important exception – the lease
price coefficients are positive but statistically insignificant in all reported models. We hesitate to conclude much
from this exercise, given that our tests suggest that the lease price is not, in fact, endogenous (suggesting that IV is
unnecessary), and the challenges to 2SLS with such a small sample. For example, the test statistics for the IV
estimators indicate that the models are only weakly identified, resulting in low first stage F-test statistics.
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heterogeneity when pooling state markets together and with the available data. Thus, we also
examine the Mojave water rights market, within the Mojave River Basin Area’s jurisdiction
located in San Bernardino County, California, to see if more active trading in a more
homogeneous market comports more closely with the asset pricing model. The Mojave market is
a relatively well-defined groundwater market, where monitoring and verification of water
production responsibilities are performed by a Watermaster, which also acts as a clearinghouse
for trades. We apply the asset pricing model to the Mojave market by re-estimating equation (4)
with the Mojave data, instead of the multi-state data used in section 3.
4.1 Mojave market data and model
Summary statistics for all the variables used in the asset pricing model estimation for the Mojave
market are presented in Table 2. We obtained water transfer data for the Mojave water rights
market from the annual Watermaster’s water transfer reports posted on the Mojave Water
Agency’s website (Mojave Water Agency 2016). The dataset consists of groundwater transfers
in five subareas (Alto, Baja, Centro, Este, and Oeste).13 The data comprise price and quantity
information for 3,368 transactions (288 permanent transfers and 3,080 one-year leases) between
1995 and 2018.14 Table 4 summarizes the Mojave market data. As expected, and similar to the
multi-state case, permanent transfer prices exceed lease prices. As shown in Figure 2, the
positive correlation between the transfer and lease prices is stronger in the Mojave market than in
the nine-state and three-state samples. That relationship becomes even clearer when we consider
only the two most active subareas (Alto and Baja) in the sample. Price dispersion is noticeable
across the subareas. Prices for both permanent transfers and leases are highest in the Alto
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https://www.mojavewater.org/files/mbamap_3wm931f0.pdf
Originally the dataset included 4,086 observations. We dropped 718 observations with missing price information
and when the reported price was zero.
14
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subarea, followed by Oeste and Centro (Table 4). Price differences could be linked to primary
water uses in these areas. In the Mojave Basin Area, water has five different uses: agricultural,
municipal, golf course irrigation, industrial, and recreational. The Mojave dataset does not
provide information about water uses at the transaction level. However, the Watermaster’s
Annual Reports (2016) identify major water uses by subarea: Alto – urban, Baja – agricultural,
Centro – agricultural and urban, Este – agricultural, Oeste – agricultural and urban. Thus, we can
say that water rights prices are highest in the three areas using relatively more urban water, likely
reflecting higher-valued uses. The Mojave dataset contains 89 observations (after converting
transfer and lease prices to quarterly averages, as we did in the multi-state case), from the five
subareas between 1996 and 2018.
There are two differences between the variables in equation (4) for the multi-state asset
pricing model described earlier, and those for the Mojave asset pricing model. First, index j
represents a subarea in the Mojave model, instead of a state. Second, the constant growth rate (g)
in the Mojave model is proxied by the urban and agricultural water consumption growth rate,
rather than the growth of acres irrigated. We use urban water consumption data for the Alto,
Centro, and Oeste subareas, and agricultural water consumption data for Baja and Este, making g
somewhat more asset-specific than we were able to do in the multi-state context (where g varied
only by state, because we could not identify the actual location of the transaction at a finer spatial
scale). Water consumption data were obtained from the annual Watermaster’s reports posted on
the Mojave Water Agency website, and they vary by subarea-year, beginning in 2000. Following
Newell, Papps and Sanchirico (2007), as we did in the multi-state case, the growth rate variable
is estimated using an AR(1) model (where we include the natural log of water consumption,
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year, and a constant) for each subarea.15 The estimated value represents the likely future growth
in demand for water, assuming the historical drivers of growth will continue into the future.
4.2 Results for the Mojave market
Results for the Mojave water rights market case are reported in Table 5. We estimate the same
RE and FE models as we did in the multi-state analysis, starting with the full five-subarea
Mojave sample in columns (1) through (3) of Table 5. The results mostly yield the expected
coefficient signs: permanent transfer prices are positively correlated with lease prices and the
growth rate, and negatively correlated with real interest rates. The magnitude of the lease price
coefficient is somewhat higher (0.18-0.58) than in the nine-state sample (0.14-0.17), suggesting a
greater influence of lease prices on transfer prices. Unexpectedly, the risk premium coefficient is
negative and statistically insignificant, which might be impacted by the relatively smaller area
that the Mojave Basin represents, and as a result, less variation. Also, urban water use is
dominant in some subareas of the region, which may not be as well-represented by the IVI.
We also estimated the same model on a sample comprising only the two most active
subareas in the Mojave region: Alto and Baja. The majority of the quarterly observations in the
sample (69 out of 89 area-quarters) are associated with these two areas. The results (shown in
columns 4 through 6 of Table 5) imply that the water market consisting of the Alto and Baja
subareas of the Mojave exhibits the greatest efficiency among all of the markets we examine, as
evident from the large significant coefficient on the lease price (model (5)). In the Alto and Baja
subareas of the Mojave market, a one percent change in the one-year lease price will result in a
74 percent change in the permanent water rights price. (The signs for the remaining estimated
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The Durbin’s h test statistic of no autocorrelation was not rejected. The values for water consumption by subarea
were not reported until 2000; thus, our proxy is estimated using data from 2000-2018, but the constant growth
variable is applied to the entire dataset, 1996-2018.
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coefficients are also consistent with asset pricing theory.) As in the multi-state asset pricing
model, there is a potential concern about endogenous lease prices, but endogeneity tests suggest
that the lease price is exogenous; for completeness, IV results are reported in the Appendix,
Table A2, using the same instruments as in the multi-state case (average lease prices by regionyear, excluding local observations). Note that we cannot identify the risk premium (IVI)
coefficient in the two-area models, due to insufficient variation.
The results for the Mojave market, a market that is known to have fewer barriers to trade
in comparison to the multi-state markets, suggest that there is significant potential for efficiency
improvements in other water markets if barriers to trade were addressed.
5. Conclusions
We examine the degree to which U.S. western water market prices in nine states act as asset
pricing theory would predict. Findings suggest that water market transactions do generally
comport with the asset pricing model; for example, permanent water transfer prices are positively
correlated with one-year lease prices and negatively correlated with the real interest rate.
However, the smaller coefficients associated with lease prices in the water markets in
comparison to fishing quota markets suggest significant potential for market efficiency
improvements in the water market case.
We find that water market efficiency is highest in one of the most active U.S. water rights
markets located in the Mojave Basin Area—markets that are known to have lower barriers to
trade. The coefficients on water lease prices are higher in the Mojave markets than in other
water markets and, in the case of the two most active areas of the Mojave market, the coefficient
on lease prices is almost as high as those in New Zealand fishing quota markets. This difference
in results suggests that there is significant potential for efficiency improvements in water rights
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markets in the western U.S., which could lead to higher welfare gains from the reallocation of
water.
Taken together, the results provide reason for optimism about water rights markets in the
western U.S. Comparing water rights transfers in the U.S. with other natural resource markets
allows us to better understand the efficiency potential in these increasingly common markets for
created natural resource assets. It is likely that a significant portion of the differences in the
relationship between short-term and permanent transfers across different water rights markets, as
well as other natural resource markets, can be attributed to the institutions that define and govern
these markets. Poor governance across many water markets in the western U.S. is often
expressed by the lack of accountability, monitoring, and enforcement. Most surface water and
some groundwater rights in the western U.S. are governed by the prior appropriation doctrine,
where water rights are allocated based on seniority (“first in time, first in right”) leading to
greater market frictions. This allocation rule tends to be less significant for short-term transfers,
which also tend to be associated with lower transaction costs due to a simpler administrative
process. Some regional water markets in the western U.S. are well-functioning. The market in
the Mojave River Basin is one of them, which is supported by our findings. Transactions in this
market are well recorded and managed, and rights are not allocated based on “first in time, first
in right”, allowing for faster and less costly transfers.
The ability to quantify the efficiency of water rights transfers as a whole provides an
opportunity to measure progress in market development, learn from better-functioning markets,
and as a result, advance policies to reduce barriers to water trading. Continuation of the analysis
of the price relationship between short- and long-term water transfers is necessary; however,
more available data is needed to advance our empirical assessment. Our analysis of the western
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U.S. region was limited with the dataset ending in 2010. Various water management efforts have
been progressing since then that are likely to affect water accessibility and management to
different water stakeholders in the near future. Examples include: so-called “smart market”
development (Young & Brozović 2016); an attempt to redefine the seniority rule based on the
Australian example in Diamond Valley, Nevada (Young 2015, Zeff et al. 2019, Wheeler et al.
2017); the existence of local informal water transfers (Young & Brozović 2019); and an increase
in groundwater protection efforts (e.g., Sustainable Groundwater Management Act in California;
Babbitt et al. 2017). Further work that examines the multilayered water rights structures, policies
and regulations that support efficient resource reallocation could make a valuable contribution to
enhancing water markets’ capacity to mitigate anticipated future reductions or increased
variation in water supply in the U.S. West and elsewhere.

19

References
Alston, J.M. 1986. “An Analysis of Growth of U.S. Farmland Prices, 1963-82.” American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 68(1): 1-9.
Babbitt, C., M. Hall, A. Hayden, A.L. Garcia Briones, R. Young, and N. Brozović, 2017.
“Groundwater Trading as a Tool for Implementing California’s Sustainable Groundwater
Management Act.” Environmental Defense Fund. Available at
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/documents/water-markets.pdf
Basta, E. and B.G. Colby, 2010. “Water Market Trends: Transactions, Quantities, and Prices.”
Appraisal Journal, 78(1), 50-69.
Bjornlund, H., and J. McKay. 2002. “Aspects of Water Markets for Developing Countries:
Experiences from Australia, Chile, and the U.S.” Environment and Development
Economics 7(4): 769-795.
Brewer, J., R. Glennon, A. Ker, and G. Libecap. 2008. “2006 Presidential Address Water
Markets in the West: Prices, Trading and Contractual Forms.” Economic Inquiry 46(2):
91-112.
Brookshire, D.S., B. Colby, M. Ewers, and P.T. Ganderton. 2004. “Market Prices for Water in
the Semiarid West of the United States.” Water Resources Research 40(9): 1-8.
Brown, T.C., 2006. “Trends in Water Market Activity and Price in the Western United States.”
Water Resources Research 42.
Bruno, E. M., and K. K. Jessoe. 2019. Water markets and climate change adaptation: micro-level
evidence on agricultural water demand. Working Paper, University of California,
Berkeley.

20

Campbell, J.Y., A.W. Lo, and A.C. MacKinlay. 1997. The Econometrics of Financial Markets.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Carey, J., D.L. Sunding, and D. Zilberman. 2002. “Transaction Costs and Trading Behavior in an
Immature Water Market.” Environment and Development Economics 7(4): 733-750.
Chang, C., and R.C. Griffin. 1992. “Water marketing as a Reallocative Institution in Texas.”
Water Resources Research 28(3): 879-890.
Cochrane, J.H. 1992. “Explaining the Variance of Price-Dividend Ratios.” The Review of
Financial Studies 5(2): 243-280.
Colby, B.G., E. Basta, and K. Adams, 2011. “Temporary Water Transactions and Climate
Change Adaptation.” In B.G. Colby and G.B. Frisvold, eds. Adaptation and Resilience:
The economics of climate, water, and energy challenges in the American Southwest. RFF
Press, Washington, DC.
Costello, C., S.D. Gaines, and J. Lynham. 2008. “Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?”
Science 321(5896): 1678-1681.
Diao, X., and T. Roe. 2003. “Can a Water Market Avert the “Double-Whammy” of Trade
Reform and Lead to a “Win-Win” Outcome?” Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 45(3): 708-723.
Easter, K.W., M.W. Rosegrant, and A. Dinar, 1999. “Formal and Informal Markets for Water:
Institutions, Performance, and Constraints.” The World Bank Research Observer 14(1),
99-116.
Edwards, E.C., and G.D. Libecap. 2015. “Water Institutions and the Law of One Price.” In R.
Halvorsen and D.F. Layton eds. Handbook on the Economics of Natural Resources.
Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 442-473.

21

Goemans, C., and J. Pritchett, 2014. “Western Water Markets: Effectiveness and Efficiency.” In
K.W. Easter and Q. Huang, ed. Water Markets for the 21st Century. What Have We
Learned? Global Issues in Water Policy 11.
Grafton, R.Q., G.D. Libecap, E.C. Edwards, R.J. O’Brien, and C. Landry, 2012. “Comparative
Assessment of Water Markets: Insights from the Murray-Darling Basin of Australia and
the Western USA.” Water Policy, 14(2), 175-93.
Grafton, R.Q., J. Horne, S. Wheeler, 2016. “On the marketisation of water: Evidence from the
Murray-Darling Basin, Australia.” Water Resources Management 30(3), pp. 913-926.
Grainger, C.A., and C. Costello. 2011. “The Value of Secure Property Rights: Evidence from
Global Fisheries.” The National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper No.
17019.
—

2014. “Capitalizing Property Rights Insecurity in Natural Resource Assets.” Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 67(2): 224-240.

Hagerty, N. 2019. “Liquid Constrained: Estimating the Potential Gains from Water Markets.”
University of California, Berkeley. Working Paper.
Hansen, K., R. Howitt, and J. Williams, 2013. “Water Trades in the Western United States: Risk,
Speculation, and Property Rights.” In J. Maetsu, ed. Water Trading and Global Water
Scarcity: International Perspectives.
Hansen, K., R. Howitt, and J. Williams, 2014. “An Econometric Test of Water Market Structure
in the Western United States.” Natural Resources Journal 55, 127-152.
Hartman, L. M., and D. Seastone. 1970. “Water Transfers: Economic Efficiency and Alternative
Institutions.” Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

22

Hearne, R., and G. Donoso. 2014. “Water Markets in Chile: Are They Meeting Needs?” In K.W.
Easter and Q. Huang eds. Water Markets for the 21st Century. Global Issues in Water
Policy: Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 103-126.
Hearne, R.R., and K.W. Easter. 1997. “The Economic and Financial Gains from Water Markets
in Chile.” Agricultural Economics 15(3): 187-199.
Howe, C.W. and C. Goemans, 2003. “Water Transfers and Their Impacts: Lessons from Three
Colorado Water Markets.” Journal of the American Water Resources Association, 39(5),
1055-1065.
Howitt, R.E. and K.M. Hansen, 2005. “The Evolving Western Water Markets. Choices 20(1).
Huffaker R. 2005. “Finding a Modern Role for the Prior Appropriation Doctrine in the American
West.” In C. Gopalakrishnan, C. Tortajada, and A.K. Biswas eds. Water Institutions:
Policies, Performance and Prospects. Springer, pp. 187-200.
Keohane, N.O. 2007. “Cost Savings from Allowance Trading in the 1990 Clean Air Act:
Estimates from a Choice-Based Model.” In: J. Freeman, and C.D. Kolstad, eds. Moving
to Markets in Environmental Regulation. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 194229.
Libecap, G.D., 2010. “Water Rights and Markets in the U.S. Semi-Arid West: Efficiency and
Equity Issues.” In: Proceedings of the Conference on The Evolution of Property Rights
Related to Land and Natural Resources, Lincoln House, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
September 20–21, 2010.
Liu J., Hertel T., Lammers R., Prusevich A., Baldos U., Grogan D.S., Frolking, S. Achieving
sustainable irrigation water withdrawals: Global impacts on food security and land use.
Environ. Res. Lett. 12 (2017) 104009, doi:10.1088/1748-9326/aa88db.

23

Loch, A., S. Wheeler, C. Settre, 2018. “Private transaction costs of water trade in the MurrayDarling Basin. Ecological Economics.” 146, pp. 560-573.
Mojave Water Agency. Water Transfer Reports. https://www.mojavewater.org
/water_transfer_reports.html (accessed 15 August 2016).
—

Watermaster Annual Reports. https://www.mojavewater.org
/annual_report.html (accessed 15 August 2016).

National Research Council. 2001. Compensating for Wetland Losses Under the Clean Water Act.
Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
Newell, R.G., K.L. Papps, and J.N. Sanchirico. 2007. “Asset Pricing in Created Markets.”
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 89(2): 259-272.
Newell, R.G., J.N. Sanchirico, and S. Kerr. 2005. “Fishing Quota Markets.” Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 49(3): 437-462.
Olmstead, S.M. 2010. “The Economics of Managing Scarce Water Resources.” Review of
Environmental Economics and Policy 4(2): 179-198.
Olmstead, S.M., K.A., Fisher-Vanden, and R. Rimsaite, 2016. “Climate Change and Water
Resources: Some Adaptation Tools and Their Limits.” Journal of Water Resource
Planning and Management, 142(6).
Parkhurst, G.M., and J.F. Shogren. 2003. “Evaluating Incentive Mechanisms for Conserving
Habitat.” Natural Resources Journal 43(4): 1093-1149.
Pujol, J., M. Raggi, and D. Viaggi. 2006. “The Potential Impact of Markets for Irrigation Water
in Italy and Spain: A Comparison of Two Study Areas.” Australian Journal of
Agricultural and Resource Economics 50(3): 361-380.

24

Rey, D., A. Garrido, and J. Calatrava. 2014. “Water Markets in Spain: Meeting Twenty-First
Century Challenges with Twentieth Century Regulations.” In K.W. Easter and Q. Huang
eds. Water Markets for the 21st Century. Global Issues in Water Policy: Springer,
Dordrecht, pp. 127-147.
Rosegrant, M.W., C. Ringler, and T. Zhu, 2014. “Water Markets and Adaptive Response to
Climate Change.” In K.W. Easter and Q. Huang eds. Water Markets for the 21st Century.
Global Issues in Water Policy: Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 35-55.
Saliba, B., and D.B. Bush. 1987. Water Markets in Theory and Practice. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press.
Smith, R.T., ed., 2002-2010. Transactions. Water Strategist. Stratecon, Claremont, CA.
Smith, R.T., and R.J. Vaughan, eds., 1990-1994. Transactions. Water Intelligence Monthly.
Stratecon, Claremont, CA.
—

1995-2001. Transactions. Water Strategist. Stratecon, Claremont, CA.

Scott A., and G. Coustalin. 1995. “The Evolution of Water Rights.” Natural Resources Journal
35: 821-980.
Schmalensee, R., and R.N. Stavins. 2017. “The Design of Environmental Markets: What Have
We Learned from Experience with Cap and Trade?” Oxford Review of Economic Policy
33(4): 572-588.
Teitenberg, T.H., 1990. “Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation.” Oxford Review
of Economic Policy 6(1): 17-33
Tisdell, J. 2014. “The Evolution of Water Legislation in Australia.” In K.W. Easter and Q.
Huang (eds.), Water Markets for the 21st Century. Global Issues in Water Policy:
Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 163-178.

25

USDA Irrigation and Water Management Survey: https://www.nass.usda.gov/Surveys
/Guide_to_NASS_Surveys/Farm_and_Ranch_Irrigation/ (accessed December 10 2019).
U.S. Federal Reserve. Selected Interest Rates: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases
/h15/data.htm (accessed November 12 2015).
Vaux, H. J., and Richard E. Howitt. 1984. “Managing Water Scarcity: An Evaluation of
Interregional Transfers.” Water Resources Research. 20:785-792.
Wilson, N., and D.A. Sumner. 2004. “Explaining Variations in the Price of Dairy Quota: Flow
Returns, Liquidity, Quota Characteristics, and Policy Risk.” Journal of Agricultural and
Resource Economics 29(1): 1-16.
Wheeler, S., H. Bjornlund, and A. Loch. 2014. “Water Trading in Australia: Tracing Its’
Development and Impact Over the Past Three Decades.” In K.W. Easter and Q. Huang
(Ed.), Water Markets for the 21st Century. Global Issues in Water Policy: Springer,
Dordecht, pp. 179-202.
Wheeler, S., A. Loch, L. Crase, M. Young, R. Grafton, 2017. “Developing a water market
readiness assessment framework.” Journal of Hydrology 552, pp. 807-820.
Yoskowitz, D.W. 1999. “Spot Market for Water Along the Texas Rio Grande: Opportunities for
Water Management.” Natural Resources Journal 39(2): 345-355.
Young, M. 2015. “Unbundling Water Rights: A Blueprint for Development of Robust Water
Allocation Systems in the Western United States.” NI R 15-01. Durham, NC: Duke
University. http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/publications.
Young, R., and N. Brozović, 2016.”Innovations in Groundwater Management: Smart Markets
for Transferable Groundwater Transaction Rights.” Technology & Innovation, 17(4),
2019-226.

26

Young, R., and N. Brozović,, 2019. “Agricultural Water Transfers in the Western United States.”
Daugherty Water for Food Global Institute and Mammoth Trading. Available at
https://waterforfood.nebraska.edu/-/media/projects/dwfi/documents/resources/2019agricultural-water-transfers-report.pdf?la=en
Zeff, H., D. Kaczan, G.W.,Characklis, M. Jeuland, B. Murray, & K. Locklier, 2019. “Potential
Implications of Groundwater Trading and Reformed Water Rights in Diamond Valley,
Nevada.” Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 145(6), 05019009.
Zuo, A., S. Wheeler, W. Adamowicz, P. Boxall, D. Hatton-MacDonald, 2015. “Measuring price
elasticities of demand and supply of water entitlements based on stated and revealed
preference data.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 98(1), pp. 314-332.

27

Table 1. Annual Average Transactions, Quantities, and Prices by State and for the Full Nine-State Sample, 1990-2010
Number

Number of

of leases

transfers

AZ

2.3

CA

Qty. leased (AF)

Qty. transferred (AF)

Lease price ($/AF)

Transfer price ($/AF)

State
to urb

to ag

total

to urb

to ag

total

urb

ag

total

urb

ag

total

2.6

259253

237671

222668

3585

825

3380

103

59

68

1347

835

1182

12.1

2.2

14464

8523

9371

12206

9978

11839

130

68

91

2129

953

1998

CO

3.4

64.0

7903

5304

8042

148

31

115

100

29

78

10456

7184

10142

ID

3.4

1.7

11805

15557

15583

1140

1700

1604

14

11

12

645

1095

988

NM

1.0

2.2

n/a

22455

22455

164

774

232

n/a

46

46

4177

2701

4013

NV

1.0

2.3

7700

448

5283

625

n/a

625

45

43

45

9243

n/a

9243

TX

9.1

3.7

1885

7413

3852

10025

7217

9196

224

31

162

1655

1288

1618

UT

1.4

1.8

3037

9944

9312

677

94

538

181

7

30

1693

1410

1566

WA

1.4

1.4

1320

5352

5005

15209

1370

15336

80

34

39

819

266

842

Total

26.7

76.0

10809

19505

16951

884

1101

849

183

49

109

9342

5780

8944

Note: All statistics are yearly averages weighted by number of transactions that occurred in each year during the period 1990-2010. Most states do not have
observations for every year of this period. Number of leases and number of transfers indicate an annual average number of 1-year leases and permanent transfers
for each state, conditional on a lease/transfer (e.g., AZ had 23 permanent transfers, which occurred during 9 years during 1990-2010; hence, the annual average
number of transfers is 2.6). Qty. leased and transferred is an annual average transferred to urban, to agricultural, and to both (total) uses. Lease and transfer prices
indicate annual average price per acre-foot paid for water to be used in urban, agricultural, and both (total) sectors. Total average (bottom row) is the mean of 21
yearly averages over the period 1990-2010 without state weights (e.g., total of 1,597 transfers across the 9 states during 21 years is 76 transfers/year); the total
average in the bottom row does not equal the sum of state averages due to the unbalanced panel (e.g., in Arizona, permanent transfers occurred in 9 years during
the 1990-2010 period, but only 8 of those years showed transactions to urban uses, and only 3 of those years showed transactions to agricultural uses).
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for the Asset pricing Models
Nine-state model

Mojave market model

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Transfer price ($/AF)

4504.23

6451.63

76.44

28298.85

2108.13

1794.43

58.51

5546.25

Lease price ($/AF)

95.25

108.57

1.47

559.48

122.63

123.01

1.00

422.58

0.10

0.35

-0.76

0.75
0.50

0.26

0.13

0.95

Growth rate:
Farm acres irrigated
Water consumption
Risk premium:
Irrigation vulnerability index

0.57

7.53

-2.41

59.47

-20.43

8.63

-42.52

-7.14

Real interest rate

0.01

0.02

-0.02

0.03

-0.00

0.02

-0.03

0.03

Areas (J)

9 states: AZ, CA, CO, ID, NM, NV, TX, UT, WA

5 Subareas: Alto, Baja, Centro, Este, Oeste

Quarters (Q)

4

4

Years (T)

18 (1992-2009)

24 (1995-2018)

Observations (N)

66

89
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Table 3. Asset Pricing Model Results for the Nine-State Sample (Dependent Variable: Log Transfer
Price)

Log lease price

Growth rate: Acres

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(9 states)

(9 states)

(9 states)

(3 states)

(3 states)

(3 states)

0.154*

0.172**

0.171***

0.146

0.146**

0.153**

(0.070)

(0.076)

(0.064)

(0.071)

(0.072)

(0.063)

____

1.154*

1.039*

____

-1.650***

-2.395***

(0.631)

(0.617)

(0.061)

(0.141)

0.046***

0.052***

1.476***

1.349***

(0.013)

(0.012)

(0.069)

(0.092)

irrigated
Risk premium: Irrigation

____

vulnerability index
Real interest rate

Time trend

-20.061** -20.164***

____

-9.403

-22.767

-22.767***

-11.437

(7.320)

(7.514)

(6.571)

(8.306)

(8.477)

(7.851)

____

____

0.070***

____

____

0.068***

(0.013)

(0.017)

State controls

FE

RE

RE

FE

RE

RE

N (obs)

66

66

66

53

53

53

0.212

0.053

0.106

0.269

0.724

0.788

R2

Note: *** Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%, *Significance at 10%; values in parentheses are
robust standard errors clustered by state. All models include a constant. Robustness checks using a
different proxy (major irrigated crop prices instead of acres-irrigated) for the growth rate variable are
reported in Appendix, Table A3.
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Table 4. Annual Average Transfers, Quantities and Prices by Subarea and for the Total
Mojave Sample
Number

Number of

Qty. leased

Qty. transferred

Lease price

Transfer price

of leases

transfers

(AF)

(AF)

($/AF)

($/AF)

Alto

86.1

7.3

224

199

174

2908

Baja

23.8

3.3

119

115

25

349

Centro

6.4

3.7

226

331

43

1263

Este

9.0

1.7

47

199

36

494

Oeste

3.6

1.2

370

704

67

2486

Total

128

12.0

197

219

137

1710

Subarea

Note: All statistics are yearly averages. The total 5-subarea market statistics are yearly averages without
subarea weights.

31

Table 5. Asset pricing model results for the Mojave sample (Dependent Variable: Log
Transfer Price)

Log lease price

Growth rate: Water

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(5 areas)

(5 areas)

(5 areas)

(2 areas)

(2 areas)

(2 areas)

0.413

0.584**

0.179

0.736*

0.736***

0.401

(0.285)

(0.239)

(0.216)

(0.115)

(0.116)

(0.313)

____

1.385***

1.750***

____

2.116***

2.674***

(0.359)

(0.223)

(0.589)

(0.736)

-0.026

-0.024

____

____

____

(0.024)

(0.015)

-14.096

-9.859

-2.441

-3.724

-3.724

-2.290

(8.480)

(8.504)

(3.725)

(7.131)

(7.185)

(3.436)

____

____

0.043**

____

____

0.025

consumption
Risk premium: Irrigation

____

vulnerability index
Real interest rate

Time trend

(0.018)

(0.018)

Subarea controls

FE

RE

RE

FE

RE

RE

N (obs)

89

89

89

69

69

69

0.480

0.717

0.799

0.756

0.903

0.914

R2

Note: *** Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%, *Significance at 10%; values in parentheses are
robust standard errors, clustered by state. All models include a constant. The proxy for the growth rate
variable is historical urban water consumption in the case of Alto, Centro and Oeste and agricultural
water consumption in the case of Baja and Este.
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Figure 1. Average number of transactions and quantity traded (top) and average prices of
transactions (bottom) in the nine-state water market sample
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Figure 2. Average (quarterly) lease and transfer prices in the multi-state data and the
Mojave data
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A. APPENDIX
A1. Additional water transfer dataset description
The full nine-state water transactions sample from the Water Strategist includes 5,099
observations. The original data included 12 states (5,467 transactions); however, two of those
states (Oregon and Wyoming) had no recorded permanent transfers and one state (Montana) had
only one recorded permanent transfer. Both permanent transfers and one-year leases within a
state-year are required to empirically estimate the asset pricing model; therefore, these three
states were dropped from our sample.
Buyers and sellers are grouped into three main categories: agricultural, urban, and
environmental sectors. Water rights transactions generally happen in one of three forms:
permanent transfers, one-year leases and multi-year leases. Long–term leases vary greatly in
length across observations (2 to 100 years) and represent the smallest number of transactions in
this dataset. In this study, we focus on two types of market transactions: water rights permanent
transfers and one-year leases. We omit observations associated with recycled effluent water,
storage rights, and multi-year leases.16 In order to provide a better understanding of quantities
and prices in the market, we also omit observations with missing prices, prices lower than
$1/acre-foot, and unidentified buyers. 17
Water market issues related to environmental flows are unique, complex, and beyond the
scope of this paper; we eliminate 529 transactions involving that sector. The agricultural sector is

16

154 (out of 5,099) observations are associated with reclaimed effluent water; 47 (out of 5,099) trades involve
storage rights; 407 (out of 5,099) observations are leasing contracts for longer than 1-year period. (The groups of
omitted observations are not mutually exclusive.)
17
The actual price of the transaction was missing in 1,423 (out of 5,099) transactions, mostly for the following
reasons: 1) the price was not provided; 2) the price was provided for a transaction that included both land and water;
or 3) water rights were dedicated or exchanged for in-kind services. We dropped 32 transactions with a price lower
than $1/af. We also dropped two outliers with one-year lease prices higher than $5,400/af, (the average one-year
lease price is $109/af). We also dropped 419 transactions not reporting the sector of the buyer.
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the largest water supplier in the western states; thus, we keep only those transactions that were
associated with water coming from agricultural irrigators, eliminating the 702/5,099 water
transactions where the urban sector was the seller or lessor.
A2. Irrigation Vulnerability Index
The Irrigation Vulnerability Index (IVI) is constructed as in Liu et al. (2017), using their data to
construct our proxy for the risk premium (!) in the asset pricing models. In this approach,
irrigation vulnerability is defined as:
(water supply – water use) / irrigation water use
where water supply is the sum of surface water (including reservoir storage) and renewable
groundwater sources. Water use is the sum of irrigation, domestic, industrial, and livestock
water use. Lower values of the index indicate higher levels of water stress. An irrigation
vulnerability < 0.2 is considered stressed. Irrigation vulnerability can have negative values,
which occur where unsustainable water supplies are used to fulfill the water use category.
Water supply, water use, and irrigation water use are simulated by the University of New
Hampshire’s Water Balance Model (WBM) at the grid cell level and at a daily time step and
provided here as state-level (and basin-level for the Mojave), annual aggregates. Where water
supply is less than water use, unsustainable groundwater is used to fulfill the water use
requirement.
WBM simulations for 2013 – 2099 are driven by the GISS-E2-R RCP 8.5 climate
scenario, bias-corrected using the delta change method. The obtained annual IVI values were
averaged over this long-run period for each state to show the mean projection for long-term
water stress. Results suggest that Arizona is projected to be most stressed in irrigation water
availability followed by California, Texas, and Colorado (Table A4).
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Note the exceptionally high value of the index for the state of Nevada. While this is an unusual
value, Nevada contributes a small number of transactions to our multi-state sample, and the main
results are robust to dropping Nevada (along with all other states except California, Colorado and
Texas), as noted in the discussion of Table 3 in the main paper. Thus, this value does not appear
to substantially influence our results.
A.2.1. WBM methods and data for simulating water use and water supply
Note: these methods have been published before, and the relevant citations are: Wisser et al.
(2010), Grogan (2016), and Liu et al. (2017).
Irrigation water use
Input data
Inputs to WBM for simulation irrigation water use are: crops maps, soil properties, crop
parameters, daily mean temperature, and daily precipitation. Crop maps (i.e., the location,
growing area, and growing season) are from the MIRCA2000 data base (Portmann et al 2000).
Soil properties – namely, field capacity and soil available water capacity – are from the
Harmonized World Soil Database v1.1 (FAO/IIASA/ISRIC/ISSCAS/JRC, 2009). Crop
parameters kc, CDFc, and RDc are from Siebert and Döll (2010). We use the GISS-E2-R global
circulation model (Schmidt et al., 2014) representative concentration pathway (RCP) 8.5 to
provide temperature and precipitation inputs.
Method
In WBM, crops extract water from the soil moisture each day of the crop’s growing season.
Given sufficient water in the soil moisture pool, the amount of water used by each crop is the
crop potential evapotranspiration, PETc [mm]:
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where PET0 [mm] is a reference evapotranspiration, and kc [-] is a crop-specific, time-varying
scalar. This method follows the FAO-recommended crop-modeling methodology outlined in
Allen et al (1998). Here, we use the Penman-Monteith method for estimating PET0 (Allen et al,
1998).

If soil moisture levels fall below a crop-specific threshold, SMTc [mm], then irrigation water is
called for. Soil moisture threshold SMTc for crop c is:

where CDFc [-] is a crop depletion factor, RDc [mm] is the crop’s root depth, and AWcap [-] is
the soil’s available water capacity.

When soil moisture is below SMTc, then the time step’s net irrigation water demand, Inet,t, is the
difference between the current soil moisture and field capacity:

where Fcap [mm] is the soil’s field capacity, and SMt [mm] is the soil moisture at time t. Annual
net irrigation water use is the sum of all daily net irrigation water uses through the year. We
assume no shortage of water for irrigation; when water supply is insufficient to meet the crop’s
irrigation water requirement, then additional water is added to the soil moisture from an
unlimited “unsustainable” water source.
Domestic and industrial water use
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Input data
Data inputs for domestic and industrial water use are: domestic per capita water use, industrial
per capita water use, and population density. Time series of domestic per capita water use,
DWpp and industrial per capita water use, IWpp, are from Liu et al (2017). Annual population
density projections are from the IIASA decadal projections (IIASA, 2007) under the B2 scenario.
Method
In WBM, the domestic and industrial sectors use water each day. Domestic water use, Dw [mm],
is:
"# = & ⋅ "()) ⋅ "*+* ,
and industrial water use, Iw [mm] is:
,# = & ⋅ ,()) ⋅ "*+* ,

where
A [km2] is the area of the grid cell
DWpp [mm/d] is the domestic water use per capita
IWpp [mm/d] is the industrial water use per capita
Dpop [persons km-2] is the population density.
Livestock water use
Input data
Input data for livestock water use are: average daily temperature, livestock density for each
livestock category, service water per head, and two growth parameters. All livestock data and
methods are from FAO (2006) and FAO employee Dominik Wisser (personal communication);
the same temperature inputs are used here as in the irrigation water use section.
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Method
Daily livestock water, Lw, for each livestock type is calculated each day as:
-. = ,/ + 1/ ∙ 34 + 5(/ ∙ "/
where
Il is an intercept parameter for livestock type l
sl is a slope parameter for livestock type l [-]
Tm is the daily mean temperature, with a minimum value of 0 [°C]
SWl is the daily service water volume required per animal
Dl is the density of livestock type l in the grid cell.
Livestock types represented are: buffalo, cattle, goats, pigs, poultry, and sheep.
Water supply
Input data
To simulate water supply, WBM requires inputs to represent rivers, reservoirs on those rivers,
and the water budget of non-agricultural lands (including impervious areas). The river data is the
STN-30p river network (Vörösmarty et al., 2000), and reservoir and dam inputs are from the
GRanD database (Lehner et al., 2011). Soil properties of non-agricultural lands are from the
Harmonized World Soil Database v1.1 (FAO/IIASA/ISRIC/ISSCAS/JRC, 2009), and
impervious surface data is from the Global Distribution and Density of Constructed Impervious
Surfaces database (Elvidge et al., 2007).
Method
Water supply is the sum of surface water (including reservoir storage) and renewable
groundwater sources. Renewable groundwater is defined as the volume of water stored via
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percolation through soils, minus the volume of water exiting the groundwater stores as baseflow.
Details for surface water and renewable groundwater methods are provided in Wisser et al
(2010) and Grogan (2016).

A3. Australian water market results
At the suggestion of a referee, we estimated the basic asset pricing model (shown in equation
(1)) using Australian water market transaction data.
6789: = 69:87: /<

(1)

Our empirical approach adapts equation (4) from the paper. Specifically, 9=6>?@A = BC +
BD 9=E>?@A + BF <@A + µA + H? + I>?@A , where 9=6 is the log price of entitlement transfer i (similar
to permanent water rights transfer in the U.S.), in state ?, in quarter @, and in year A; 9=E is the
log price allocation transfer (similar to one year lease in the U.S.); < is the quarterly real
Australian market interest rate; µ is a year fixed effect; H is a state fixed effect or random effect;
and I is the error term. Note that we omit the growth rate and risk premium variables, lacking
available data for this extra analysis outside of the United States, the site of our main analysis.
The Australian water transaction dataset was downloaded from the Australian
Government Bureau of Meteorology. We obtained allocation and entitlement transfers from
2007-2018 for five states for which both transfer type data were available: New South Wales,
South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia. Similar to our approach for the U.S.
markets, we omitted observations that lacked price information, were associated with bundled
water and land transfers, or were described as temporary entitlement transfers.
Transaction prices ($/ML) were converted to 2009 Australian dollars using the consumer
price index (CPI) obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics. The real interest rate was

41

calculated by using Australian 90-day T-bill rate available via the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), and adjusting for inflation using CPI – similar to the
U.S. models reported in the paper. The final quarterly averaged dataset comprised 165
observations.
Table A5 provides the results using two models: fixed effects (1), and random effects (2).
Results using both approaches yield the expected coefficient signs: entitlement transfer prices are
positively correlated with allocation transfer prices, and negatively correlated with real interest
rates. Like our U.S. results, these results for Australia are consistent with asset pricing theory.
However, given limits to data availability, we do not directly compare these results to those in
the paper. A complete application of the asset pricing model to the Australian water market case
would be an important extension of our analysis of the western U.S. water markets, and an
excellent topic for further research.
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APPENDIX TABLES
Table A1. Asset Pricing Model IV Estimation Results for the Multi-State Sample
(Dependent variable: Log Transfer Price)

Log lease price

Growth rate: Acres irrigated

Risk premium: Irrigation

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(9 states)

(9 states)

(9 states)

(3 states)

(3 states)

(3 states)

0.009

0.007

0.224

0.134

0.134

0.308

(0.543)

(0.596)

(0.283)

(0.434)

(0.554)

(0.226)

omitted

1.052

1.119**

omitted

-1.643***

-2.496***

(0.678)

(0.546)

(0.334)

(0.074)

0.046***

0.053***

1.470***

1.418***

(0.012)

(0.010)

(0.274)

(0.162)

-20.650***

-20.685***

-9.214

-22.821***

-22.821**

-10.601

(6.650)

(7.253)

(6.474)

(7.486)

(9.543)

(8.520)

____

____

0.069***

____

____

0.069***

omitted

vulnerability index
Real interest rate

Time trend

omitted

(0.013)

(0.016)

State controls

FE

RE

RE

FE

RE

RE

N (obs)

66

66

66

53

53

53

R2

0.176

0.053

0.096

0.268

0.724

0.772

Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic

3.404

3.683

3.670

3.789

3.789

3.702

Kleibergen-Paap rk.Wald F

3.614

3.735

3.744

2.742

2.580

2.659

0.169

0.169

0.177

0.178

0.178

0.184

0.705

0.707

0.910

0.972

0.981

0.613

statistic
p-value of Kleibergen-Paap rk
LM statistic
p-value of Endogeneity test

Note: *** Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%, *Significance at 10%; values in parentheses are robust standard
errors clustered by state. p-value for Hansen J statistic not provided because the equation is exactly identified.
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Table A2. Asset Pricing Model IV Estimation Results for the Mojave Market (Dependent
variable: Log Transfer Price)

Log lease price (qtr.avg)

Growth rate: Water

(1)

(3)

(4)

(5 areas)

(5 areas)

(5 areas)

-4.391

0.056

-0.975

-139.074

-139.074

-1.439

(5.533)

(0.850)

(1.221)

(14970.4)

(21654.42)

(2.879)

omitted

1.989

2.914**

omitted

699.337

7.288

(1.301)

(1.442)

(107992.7)

(7.125)

-0.063

-0.056

omitted

omitted

omitted

(0.083)

(0.058)

-133.234

-22.906

-3.883

-4023.65

-4023.65

-9.847

(177.974)

(20.906)

(8.775)

(431487.0)

(624138.1)

(17.927)

____

____

0.111*

____

____

0.126

consumption
Risk premium: Irrigation

omitted

vulnerability index
Real interest rate

Yearly trend

(5)
(2 areas)

(7)
(2 areas)

(0.057)

(8)
(2 areas)

(0.161)

Subarea controls

FE

RE

RE

FE

RE

RE

N (obs)

89

89

89

69

69

69

-21.405

0.552

0.528

-14000

0.147

0.704

Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic

0.593

11.538

5.238

0.000

0.000

4.240

Kleibergen-Paap rk.Wald F

0.566

3.356

2.278

0.000

0.000

0.437

0.498

0.141

0.224

0.993

0.993

0.530

0.396

0.131

0.131

0.771

0.000

0.000

R2

statistic
p-value of Kleibergen-Paap rk
LM statistic
p-value of Endogeneity test

Note: *** Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%, *Significance at 10%; values in parentheses are robust standard
errors clustered by state. p-value for Hansen J statistic not provided because the equation is exactly identified.
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Table A3. Robustness Check: Asset Pricing Model Results for the Nine-State Sample with
Different Growth Rate Proxy (Dependent Variable: Log Transfer Price)

Log lease price

Growth rate: Irrigated crop price

Risk premium: Irrigation

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(9 states)

(9 states)

(9 states)

(3 states)

(3 states)

(3 states)

0.154*

0.162**

0.166***

0.146

0.146**

0.153**

(0.070)

(0.072)

(0.061)

(0.071)

(0.072)

(0.063)

____

1.215

0.754

____

-6.847***

-9.940***

(2.740)

(2.732)

(0.255)

(0.585)

0.042***

0.047***

1.523***

1.417***

(0.014)

(0.015)

(0.071)

(0.089)

-20.061**

-20.026***

-9.341

-22.767

-22.767***

-11.437

(7.320)

(7.440)

(6.534)

(8.306)

(8.477)

(7.851)

____

____

0.070***

____

____

0.068***

____

vulnerability index
Real interest rate

Time trend

____

(0.013)

(0.017)

State controls

FE

RE

RE

FE

RE

RE

N (obs)

66

66

66

53

53

53

0.212

0.154

0.199

0.269

0.724

0.788

R2

Note: *** Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%, *Significance at 10%; values in parentheses are robust
standard errors clustered by state. All models include a constant. Growth rate proxy in this model is constructed for
each state based on prices of the type of crop which uses a significant amount of irrigation water in its production.
The major crops were determined based on analyzing the values for irrigated area harvested, irrigated crop/acre
yield, and average AF of water applied for acre provided in the USDA Water Management and Irrigation Survey.
Specifically, we used annual prices from 1990-2018 available at USDA for alfalfa (AZ), corn (CO, NM, TX, WA),
rice (CA), and wheat (ID, NV, UT), and constructed the time invariant growth rate variable using the AR(1)
approach (where we included the natural log of water price, year, and a constant).
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Table A4: Average long-term Irrigation Vulnerability Index by state
State
Irrigation Vulnerability Index
Arizona
-2.408
California
-1.325
Colorado
-0.101
Idaho
0.501
Nevada
59.465
New Mexico
2.253
Texas
-1.021
Utah
4.326
Washington
1.650
Table A5: Asset Pricing Model Estimation Results for Australian Water Transfers, 20072018 (Dependent Variable: Log Entitlement Transfer Price)

Year Controls

(1)
(5 states)
0.026
(0.046)
-10.298
(10.613)
Yes

(2)
(5states)
0.225***
(0.076)
-10.008
(11.772)
Yes

State Controls

FE

RE

Log lease price
Real interest rate

165
165
N (obs)
R2
0.155
0.223
Note: *** Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%, *Significance at 10%; values in parentheses are
standard errors clustered by state, which have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. All models include a
constant. Observations are from five states: New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and
Western Australia.
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